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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Succession shuffle or razzle-dazzle 'em? 
President Putin has been telegraphing the possibility of changes to his 
government since the first of the year, nonetheless, his announcement that 
Sergei Borisovich Ivanov would be leaving the Defense Ministry for the post of 
First Deputy Prime Minister came as a surprise, if not for the move that gave 
Ivanov co-equal status with Dmitri Medvedev, then for what was left unsaid by 
the president.  Why was Ivanov pulled from the Defense Ministry now?  What 
about Anatoli Serdyukov makes him a viable choice to head the Defense 
Ministry?  Who will lead the Federal Tax Service in Serdyukov's stead?  Why was 
Naryshkin elevated to the post of Deputy Prime Minister and who will head the 
Government Staff in his place? 
 
In his announcement of the changes, Putin—who was described by one source 
as "uncharacteristically nervous" as he made the announcement, "pausing often 
and flipping back and forth through a notebook" (1)—credited Ivanov with 
accomplishing "well" his task at the Defense Ministry, where weapons and 
"technical equipment" exports increased substantially, setting "yet another record 
in this sphere—more than six billion dollars." (2)  In his new post, Ivanov will have 
supervisory responsibility for the military industry and civilian sectors of the 
economy. (3) 
 
In replacing Ivanov with Anatoli Eduardovich Serdyukov, Putin stressed the 
economic credentials of the former head of the Tax Service (perhaps best known 
for his involvement in charging Yukos with astronomical tax bills) and called on 
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him "to organize effective work [in the Defense Ministry] and to spend the 
huge…budgetary resources in a rational manner."  (4)  That is a fairly low bar for 
a Defense Minister, but these priorities were reinforced when Putin met with 
senior officials from the defense ministry and collegium.  Reiterating that his new 
civilian minister would be responsible for "economic and financial aspects," Putin 
proposed a substantial increase in the work of the Genshtab: "the military 
component, the General Staff, will be more important now than ever." (5)  Well, 
yes, especially if it has to deal with all the military issues. 
 
The most ubiquitous explanation of the change in position for Ivanov concerns 
the 2008 succession:  If one postulates that there will be a constitutional 
succession in Russia next year, and further presumes that identifying potential 
frontrunners right now is relevant to the choice of successor in 2008, then moving 
Ivanov into a formal matching role with Medvedev seems to confirm their 
positions as frontrunners in this succession race.  Putin either has shored up 
Ivanov's frontrunner credentials or eroded Medvedev's miniscule lead in the 
opinion polls.  In either event, Prime Minister Fradkov is said to be pleased:  The 
two largest snakes in his government (not necessarily the most venomous) have 
just been set facing each other in a fight for political power.  Fradkov surely 
hopes that they will be too busy trying to devour each other to pay any attention 
to him…or any of his protégés.  
 
Speaking of which, what prompted Putin to bump Sergei Naryshkin into a deputy 
prime minister slot?  By some accounts, Fradkov was positively giddy and 
"lorded it over everyone at the cabinet meeting" after the personnel changes 
were announced.  (6)  In his announcement of Naryshkin's promotion, Putin did 
reference input from the Prime Minister, who, Putin claimed, "considers it 
expedient to increase work in the sphere of foreign economic relations." (7) 
 
There has been some speculation that Naryshkin was chosen by Fradkov 
personally to join the ranks of deputy prime ministers and represents a Fradkov 
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faction within the government.  Fradkov and Naryshkin have worked together for 
several years, since September 2004, when Naryshkin was appointed Chief of 
the Government Staff in the personnel shuffle that saw Dmitri Kozak leave 
Moscow to oversee the North Caucasus region in the wake of the Beslan 
tragedy.  Naryshkin's background fits comfortably in the Putin paradigm:  an 
employee (and probable KGB agent) of the Soviet embassy in Belgium in the late 
80's and early 90's, he went to work in the St. Petersburg Mayor's Office (under 
Putin's supervision) from 1992-1995. (8)  Naryshkin worked in the external 
economic relations sector in St. Petersburg, before being brought to Moscow to 
work first in the Kremlin's economic administration and then in the government. 
 
While Fradkov seems to consider Naryshkin as his ally in the snake pit, it is 
possible that Naryshkin's ties are somewhat more complicated than the Prime 
Minister may know.  He has been referred to as Putin's eyes and ears, initially 
sent to keep watch over Fradkov in Kozak's absence; he also is described as 
having close ties to the Kremlin through Igor Sechin, Putin's deputy chief of staff 
and siloviki whip. (9) 
 
It is clear that Naryshkin would have been vetted for all his Moscow 
appointments by the Kremlin cadre chief, Viktor Ivanov.  Ivanov, who apparently 
facilitated the entry of not only Putin, but also Sergei Ivanov, into the security 
services, (10) was rather quietly appointed to head up a new anti-corruption 
organization earlier this month. (11)  The new Corruption Committee, which 
replaces the old body, headed by Mikhail Kasianov, likely will have some 
headline-grabbing reports to reveal later this year, which, of course, will thrust 
Viktor Ivanov back into the succession ring in his own right. 
 
Putting aside all the personnel changes that set off the succession struggle 
alarms, perhaps Putin's most telling personnel decision this week involved 
Chechnya.  Putin removed the elected president, Alu Alkhanov, from his position 
as President of Chechnya, and replaced him with Ramzan Kadyrov. (For details 
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on this decision and its ramifications within Chechnya, please see Russian 
Federation: Domestic Affairs.)  While Putin made a point to stress that this 
shake-up in the Chechen government was undertaken at Alkhanov's request, his 
decision does reflect a willful disregard for both the process of electoral 
succession and the voice of the electorate itself. 
 
Putin clearly has set himself firmly back in the center of the political whorl, 
reminding analysts and presidential hopefuls alike that his voice, his choice, in 
the coming months, and likely years, matters a great deal. 
 
While the succession chatter dominated Russian political analyses, especially 
after the president's recent shuffle, the issue of extending Putin's presidency for a 
third term remains an evocative theme.  In a televised discussion of the Ivanov 
promotion, former Nezavisimaya gazeta founder and political analyst Vitali 
Tretyakov dismissed the talk of successors and appealed to Putin to cut to the 
chase: "I hope that our democratic country is going to forgive me.  I am 
proceeding from the assumption that Vladimir Putin should remain in office for 
the third term.  This is his historical obligation before the nation, before our 
country.  One may well play these successor games and call them candidates.  
But this is not fooling anyone in any case." (12) 
 
Putin may well heed Tretyakov's advice, or some variant thereof, wherein he will 
remain in power beyond 2008.  In any event, the succession games underway 
bring to mind Yel'tsin and his constant shifting of personnel that kept an alternate 
source of power from emerging during his presidency.  They also bring to mind 
the lyrics of a familiar show tune:  "Give 'em the old flim flam flummox, Fool and 
fracture 'em,  How can they hear the truth above the roar?  (…) Razzle dazzle 
'em,  And they'll beg you for more." (13) 
 
Source Notes:  
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(1) "Ivanov and Kadyrov promoted in shakeup," Nabi Abdullaev, The Moscow 
Times, 15 Feb 07; Independent Press via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(2) "Beginning of the meeting on economic issues," President Putin speeches via 
www.kremlin.ru, accessed 21 Feb 07. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) "Meeting with Defense Ministry Senior Officials and Collegium members," 15 
Feb 07 via www.kremlin.ru, accessed 21 Feb 07. 
(6) Newsweek Russia, No. 8, 19-25 Feb 07; WPS via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(7) "Beginning of the meeting on economic issues," Ibid. 
(8) "Naryshkin appointed Cabinet Chief," Moscow Times, 15 Sep 04; 
Independent Press via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(9) "The Season for Questions without Answers," Yevgeni Kiselyov, Moscow 
Times, 21 Feb 07 and "The Hierarchy is Spreading, Veronika Ivanova, Profil, 19-
25 Feb 07 both via David Johnson's Russia List (JRL), 2007-#43, 21 Feb 07. 
(10) "Holding on to Defense," by Pavel Felgenhauer, Novaya gazeta, No. 12, 19-
21 Feb 07; WPS via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(11) "Viktor Ivanov to replace Mikhail Kasianov," by Natalia Melikova, Mikhail 
Moshkin, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 6 Feb 07 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(12) "Sunday Night with Vladimir Solovyev," Russian NTV Mir, 1900 GMT, 18 
Feb 07; BBC Monitoring International Reports via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(13) Razzle dazzle 'em lyrics, as performed by Richard Gere in Chicago the 
Musical via http://www.stlyrics.com/lyrics/chicago/razzledazzle.htm. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Robyn Angley 
 
Kadyrov is in 
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On 15 February, President Vladimir Putin named Chechen President Alu 
Alkhanov to the post of Russian Deputy Minister of Justice. Prime Minister 
Ramzan Kadyrov has been appointed acting president in his stead. Alkhanov 
reportedly requested the transfer. These changes are the culmination of a 
process that began after the death of Ramzan Kadyrov's father, Akhmad 
Kadyrov, in May 2004. This process was hastened by comments made by 
Alkhanov in an interview that he had no desire to seek another term as president 
of Chechnya. Kadyrov's response was swift and effective. 
 
Following Alkhanov's interview, Kadyrov ordered a complete investigation of all 
the executive organs and declared that he would make sure that the cases of 
Chechens who have been detained were brought to court. According to several 
sources, he then pressured several key officials in the Alkhanov administration 
into resigning, among them German Vok, secretary of Chechnya's Public and 
Economic Security Council, on 9 February, as well as Said-Magomed Isarayev, 
Alkhanov's press secretary. (1)  Later, however, on 12 February, Vok gave an 
interview to Ekho Moskvy in his capacity as the Public and Economic Security 
Council Secretary in which he proposed that Kadyrov resign. (2)  Apparently, it 
was safer to be Alkhanov's ally outside of Chechnya rather than inside it. 
 
In early February, Presidential Envoy to the Southern District Dmitri Kozak 
denied knowledge of a plan to offer Alkhanov a different position in order to 
smooth the way for Kadyrov's appointment as the regional leader. (3) 
 
Alkhanov responded by gathering his (remaining) supporters around him. On 12 
February, he declared that his continuation as head of the region depended on 
"the will of the Almighty and the president of our country" (4)  and on 13 
February, Alkhanov hosted a meeting of all the bodies that are overseen by the 
federal government (it is from these organs that he primarily receives support). 
The local power ministries, which support Kadyrov, were conspicuously absent 
from the meeting. (5)  Alkhanov also published a statement in which he said that 
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he would not resign and that "the cult of personality and idealization of one man 
will not result in anything beneficial either for the republic or its people." (6) 
 
On 15 February, the will of the President was made known, and Alkhanov was 
assigned a new position as Deputy Minister of Justice, with Kadyrov assuming 
the role of acting president. His confirmation as Chechen President is a virtual 
certainty, although formally Dmitri Kozak must present Putin with at least two 
possibilities for Alkhanov's successor.  United Russia also has lent Kadyrov its 
backing, (7) an indication that Chechen affairs mirror developments on Moscow's 
domestic scene. 
 
Kadyrov has lost little time in assuming his new role. In a speech given just days 
after his promotion, he stated that Chechnya and Grozny will be completely 
rebuilt by 2008. (8)  He also blamed the current lack of reconstruction on the 
federal authorities, claiming that 80 percent of the funds designated for 
reconstruction in Chechnya never make it there because of corruption. (9) 
 
Kadyrov already had considerable support in Chechnya as the region's prime 
minister under Alkhanov's largely titular supervision. The recent spats between 
Alkhanov and Kadyrov only mark the death throes of a process long underway. 
The important question is what Kadyrov will do now that he has both power and 
the title to go with it. Will he use it to rebuild Chechnya into a place where 
ordinary citizens no longer experience violent conflict or will he, more likely, 
continue in the vein of the many human rights abuses he already has to his 
credit? 
 
As a postscript, the Chechen National Salvation Committee, a human rights 
organization, reported that a man, woman and infant were shot to death in early 
February in their Grozny apartment by Kadyrov's men. (10)  In other words, 
during the height of the scrutiny in the struggle over Chechnya's leadership, 
Kadyrov continued to act without regard to the law or basic human rights, in a 
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manner that thus far has characterized his ascent to leadership. The prospects 
for the future of ordinary Chechens look grim.  
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) "How far my clan has fallen," Novaya gazeta, 12-14 Feb 07; BBC Monitoring 
via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) "Chechen security chief says PM Kadyrov unfit to be president," Ekho 
Moskvy, 12 Feb  07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis; "Cult of personality 
exposure," Vremya novostey, 13 Feb 07; WPS via Lexis-Nexis.  
(3) "Alu Alkhanov will stay on," Newsweek Russia, No. 6, 5-11 Feb 07; What the 
Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis.    
(4) "Chechen President refutes resignation rumors," Ren TV, 12 Feb 07; BBC 
Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) "Chechen president enlists support of Moscow," KavkazWeb.net website, 13 
Feb 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) "Cult of personality exposure," Vremya novostey, 13 Feb 07; WPS via Lexis-
Nexis. 
(7) Carl Schreck, "United Russia now in Kadyrov column," Moscow Times, 19 
Feb 07 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(8) "Chechen leader stresses funding problems, sets economic strategy," RIA 
Novosti, 19 Feb 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(9) "Chechen leader stresses funding problems, sets economic strategy," RIA 
Novosti, 19 Feb 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(10) "Rights body reports killing of Chechen family in capital," Daymohk news 
agency website, 12 Feb 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
 9 
FSB to “safeguard” Duma elections, receive increased funding 
In December last year, Federal Security Service Director Nikolai Patrushev gave 
a number of press interviews designed to showcase the FSB and its importance 
to Russia’s National Security. According to the various interviews Patrushev 
conducted, the FSB prevented some 300 domestic terrorist attacks, neutralized 
40 Chechen rebel bands, and stopped or discovered a significant number of 
espionage plots. (1)  
    
Late in January 2007, President Vladimir Putin participated in a “taking stock” 
collegium held by the FSB at its Lubyanka Headquarters. (2) The purpose of the 
meeting was to assess the agency’s 2006 performance, and to set tasks for 
2007. In the presence of SVR Director Sergei Lebedev, Defense Minister Sergei 
Ivanov and Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliev, Putin praised the FSB’s record, 
claiming that the Russian population had “been waiting for the results you 
achieved last year for a long time,” (3) but emphasized that in future more 
attention should be devoted to the prevention of economic crimes, as well as to 
ensuring that Russia’s latest scientific and technological discoveries remained 
secret.  
    
There were two moments of real interest in Putin’s address to the collegium. 
First, the President announced that the FSB’s budget (there was no mention of 
budgets for Russia’s other Security Agencies) is to be increased by 27% in 2007. 
Employee salaries will be increased by a quarter (double the national pay-
increase), while the FSB’s weapons procurement fund—apparently separate 
from the larger budget—is to increase by 20%. (4) 
    
Secondly, Putin addressed directly the FSB’s role in providing security during the 
State Duma and regional Parliamentary elections, which are due to occur later 
this year. The President noted that society should be “safeguarded” from “any 
attempts at the ideology of extremism…and confessional intolerance penetrating 
in the public and political field.” With an apparent nod at pluralism, Putin noted 
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that “elections are a very important instrument for forming state authorities,” and 
warned the FSB that it should “work strictly within the legal framework,” to ensure 
national security during the polling period. (5) 
    
President Putin’s remarks must be viewed with some cynicism. The FSB—as 
recent history shows—hardly has the necessary “transparency credentials” to 
allow it to safeguard “democracy” in Russia. Moreover, it appears that the FSB 
itself now is openly crossing into the political realm, making a mockery of the idea 
of democratic separation of powers. On 26 January, United Russia announced 
that it had opened negotiations with FSB Director Patrushev over his accession 
to the party. Apparently, Patrushev’s membership is “a settled matter…No ifs or 
buts about it.” (6)  
    
According to “sources in the Presidential administration,” other high-level serving 
officials will follow Patrushev’s lead in joining United Russia in the near future. (7)  
It is highly unlikely that Patrushev would be permitted to join United Russia 
without the President’s personal involvement—indeed, it is entirely plausible that 
the initiative for this move came directly from the Kremlin, rather than from 
Patrushev or United Russia’s leadership.  
    
President Putin’s motivation in allowing Patrushev to enter the party political 
realm—and therefore probably win a Duma seat—may be two-fold. First, by 
allowing members of the "St. Petersburg circle" to enter positions of political 
significance he probably is preparing a "security blanket" for his eventual 
departure from office. Secondly, given Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov’s recent 
“promotion” to First Deputy Prime Minister—a move touted as preparing him for 
the succession, (8) Putin may be playing his officials off against each other, in 
order to keep them and worldwide observers guessing as to his true intentions. 
 
Update: We want Berezovsky   
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Late in November 2006, Alexander Litvinenko, a former FSB officer who had 
defected to Britain died after ingesting a lethal dose of Polonium 210. In the 
aftermath of his death, several theories as to who had committed the 
assassination emerged—or were placed in the public eye. Litvinenko’s relatives, 
friends and his employer—former Russian oligarch Boris Berezovsky—all 
favored the theory that Litvinenko’s murder had been ordered at the highest 
levels of the Russian state, and that his former colleagues at the FSB were 
responsible. Conversely, Kremlin spokespersons intimated that Litvinenko had 
been killed either by Chechen rebels or by Berezovsky himself, in a twisted 
attempt to evade continued Russian attempts to gain his extradition to face trial 
for economic charges. (9)  
    
Scotland Yard’s investigation into the murder was stymied from the beginning, as 
Yuri Chaika, Russia’s Prosecutor General, stated publicly that British police 
officers would face restrictions in their Moscow operations, and that no 
extraditions would be permitted in the case. It seemed evident that Moscow was 
attempting to use the “carrot” of cooperation with British authorities, in order to 
force Whitehall to reverse its previous decisions against Berezovsky’s extradition, 
as well as that of former Yukos officials living in London, who will now be 
questioned by FSB officers. (10)  
    
This conjecture now has been proven correct. During a meeting early in February 
2007 in Moscow between British Trade Minister Alistair Darling and Finance 
Minister Alexei Kudrin, Russian officials indicated that extradition proceedings 
against Andrei Lugovoi—Scotland Yard’s main murder suspect, according to the 
file handed by detectives to the Crown Prosecution Service (11) —would be 
vetoed unless Berezovsky was returned to Moscow. (12)  
    
Given Moscow’s focus on Berezovsky, it is evident that Litvinenko’s death was 
not conjured solely to silence his opposition to Moscow.  While Litvinenko’s death 
reaped benefits, it may have been a peripheral element in a Moscow-led scheme 
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to attack the dissident émigré community, centering around Boris Berezovsky. 
The question is, what is at stake here for Moscow? 
 
Gusak: Litvinenko a traitor  
In an interview broadcast on BBC’s Newsnight several weeks ago, Alexander 
Gusak, Litvinenko’s direct superior in the FSB’s Organized Crime Division, stated 
that Litvinenko was considered a traitor under Russian law, and as such, would 
have faced the death penalty had he returned to Russia under Soviet rule. (13)  
Gusak added that several former colleagues had offered to kill Litvinenko, but 
that he had not advised them to kill the defector. (14)  While Gusak’s statements 
cannot be read as coming from the Russian establishment itself, they indicate 
that his former colleagues bore him a great deal of animosity, and that his death 
was not unwelcome in Secret Service circles. 
 
Sources Notes: 
 
(1) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIII, Number 7 (25 Jan 07).  
(2) “Putin Reminds Russia’s Federal Security Service Of Increased Funding, 
Wages,” Channel 1 Worldwide, Moscow, in Russian, 2 Feb 07; BBC Monitoring 
via Lexis-Nexis.  
(3) Ibid.  
(4) “Putin Calls For More Funds To FSB,” RIA-Novosti, 31 Jan 07 via Lexis-
Nexis.  
(5) “Putin Urges FSB To Protect Society From Extremism At Polls,” ITAR-TASS, 
1 Feb 07 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(6) “Chekists Into The Bear’s Lair,” Tvoi den, 26 Jan 07; What The Papers Say 
via Lexis-Nexis.  
(7) Ibid. 
(8)  “Putin Lays Foundation For Succession As He Promotes Former KGB 
Defence Minister,” The Independent, 20 Feb 07 via 
www.news.independent.co.uk/europe/article2278049.ece.  
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(9) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XII, Number 5 (7 Dec 06). 
(10) “Officers Probing Litvinenko Death Will Interrogate Exiled Tycoons In 
London,” The Observer, 4 Feb 07. 
(11) Ibid. 
(12) “Send Berezovsky Back And We’ll Help With Litvinenko Case Says Russia," 
8 Feb 07, The Times of London via 
www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article1345681.ece.  
(13) “FSB Agents Offered To Kill Ex-Spy Litvinenko,” The Times Of London, 8 
Feb 07.  
(14) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces (Internal) 
By Monty Perry 
 
Missile defense uproar 
American interest in deploying a missile defense system in Central Europe has 
been the focus of heated discussion and debate in the Russian media recently.  
Specifically, the US is planning negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic, 
both NATO members and former Soviet satellite countries.  Lieutenant General 
Henry Obering, the Chief of the US Missile Defense Agency, explained that the 
system is designed to counter missiles fired by Iran and other rogue states. (1)  
The system will be part of a larger security umbrella, which includes similar 
components already in the early operational stages in Alaska and California, 
initially designed to keep watch over, and respond to, any possible North Korean 
activity.   
      
As a preliminary step, on 20 January US officials formally proposed bilateral talks 
with the Czech Republic to discuss placement of the system's radar portion on 
Czech soil.  Almost simultaneously, the US expressed interest in beginning a 
dialog with Polish authorities about deploying ten interceptor missiles in 
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southeastern Poland. (2)  Despite a US invitation for Russia to be involved in the 
development of the system, these proposals sparked a firestorm regarding what 
Russia saw as the “real” purpose of placing a missile system in such close 
proximity to its border.  In his recent three and a half hour long annual televised 
news conference, Vladimir Putin expressed serious concern over the planned 
missile defense system and described it as a threat to Russia. (3)  Claiming that 
neither Iran nor any other terrorist organizations have the ability to launch ballistic 
missiles, Putin rejected Washington’s reasoning and argued that the US is 
upsetting the strategic balance in Europe and starting an arms race. (4)  While 
this argument may be popular with a Russian populace that appreciates an 
unbending leader, it appears to disregard the need for the US to be proactive in 
efforts to anticipate future security threats.  US officials openly “acknowledged 
there is currently no long-range missile threat, but…said the United States wants 
to ‘stay ahead’ of where…a threat might develop.” (5)  “In 2005, Defense 
Intelligence Agency director Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby told a Senate committee 
hearing the agency believed Iran would have the technical capability to develop 
an intercontinental ballistic missile by 2015.” (6)  More recently, Polish military 
attaché Andrzej Lewandowski stated that experts now think Iran will have this 
capability by 2010-2013. (7)  In preparation for this looming threat, the goal of the 
cooperative Central European effort is to have the defensive system in place by 
2011. This timeline should help clarify the purpose of the project.  
      
Russian inflammatory rhetoric toward the US, however, continued as numerous 
Russian political and military leaders offered their explanations of the situation.  
The Chief of the Russian General Staff Yuri Baluyevsky shared a view similar to 
that of General Makhmut Gareyev, who serves as president of the Russian 
Academy of Military Science.  They both claim the United States’ actual purpose 
behind constructing the system in Poland and the Czech Republic is to enable 
the US to intercept Russian ICBMs early in their launch phase. (8)   In response 
to these arguments, “General Obering said the US plans in Eastern Europe were 
clearly not designed to counter Russian missiles, as Moscow contends.  There is 
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no way, shape or form that 10 interceptors can neutralize the hundreds of 
missiles in the Russian arsenal.” (9)   
      
Despite the fact that preliminary talks are underway, Russia’s concern about the 
matter appears unfounded.  First, US leaders have encouraged active 
participation by and cooperation with Russia.  Additionally, Polish officials 
recognize that, regardless of how anxious they may be to host the US system, 
they are not interested in escalating tensions among European neighbors.  
Boguslaw Majewski, a Polish foreign ministry spokesman, insisted “that any 
Polish participation had to be squared first with Moscow for fear of creating 
military tension in the region.” (10)  He said “the Americans are working quite 
hard on this, [but] they need to clear the path with the Russians and reach a 
consensus before we will move ahead. (11)   
      
Notwithstanding a clear willingness by the US to address Russian concerns, 
President Putin continues to be a harsh critic.  In fact, he has vowed to counter 
American plans with an “asymmetrical, but highly efficient” response. (12)  
Interestingly, within a week of this announcement, media sources were all 
carrying stories of Russia’s plans for a major military buildup.  These articles 
were bursting at the seams with details of strategic nuclear weapons 
procurements, greatly increased defense budgets, and goals to exceed Soviet-
era levels of combat readiness.  The common headline was nuclear ICBM 
acquisition.  Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov “told Parliament the military would 
get 17 new ballistic missiles this year, a drastic increase over the average of four 
deployed annually in recent years.” (13)  The goal is to have 84 new Topol-M 
missiles deployed by 2015.  Additionally, the 5 trillion ruble ($190 billion) 
weapons modernization program for 2007-2015 includes new tank and motor rifle 
battalions, six helicopter and six combat aviation squadrons, the overhaul of Tu-
160 Blackjack and Tu-95 Bear long-range strategic bombers, and 31 new ships 
including eight SLBM-carrying nuclear submarines. (14)   
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Putin, in his “Munich speech,” continued his “asymmetric” response to US 
actions.  Seeming to stop just short of removing his shoe, Putin derided US 
foreign policy saying it has “overstepped its national borders in every way.” (15)  
In fact, during the same speech in which he attempted to defend Russia’s sale of 
missile systems and other military hardware to countries such as Iran and 
Venezuela, he also claimed it’s the US which is driving the world into an arms 
race reminiscent of the Cold War. (16)  
      
It’s interesting that just the mention of talks concerning a purely defensive 
weapon system, still 5 years from its earliest operational capability, has stirred up 
such indignation from the Kremlin.  Perhaps President Putin  views the missile 
issue as a useful diversionary tool that allows him to refocus international 
attention away from Russian maneuvers, foreign and domestic. 
   
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Blagov, Sergei, “Iran Threat Hovers Over US-Russia Missile Dispute,” 26 Jan 
07, Cybercast News Service via http://www.cnsnews.com/viewprint.asp?page= 
/foreignbureaus/archive/200701/int20070126b.html.  
(2) “Iran Threat Behind Poland’s Interest in Missile Defense,” 6 Feb 07, Russian 
News and Information Service Novosti via 
http://en.rian.ru/world/20070206/60305061-print.html. 
(3) “Putin’s Press Marathon Spotlights US Missile Shield Plans,” 1 Feb 07, 
Russian News and Information Service Novosti via 
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070201/ 60066308-print.html. 
(4) “US Asks Czech Republic to Host Part of Missile Defense System,” 20 Jan 
07, Associated Press via 
http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,245201, 00.html.  
(5) “US Missile Defense to Counter Iranian, ‘Rogue’ Threat,” 26 Jan 07, Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty via http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticleprint/2007/01/ 
8d0653ea-49d0-4a13-ae74-7e8f4bc57a12.html.   
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(6) Blagov, Sergei, “Iran Threat Hovers Over US-Russia Missile Dispute,” 26 Jan 
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Russian arms sales in the Middle East 
With speculation of a new Cold War brewing, President Putin conducted a quick 
visit to the Middle East last week to discuss economic, political, energy and 
military cooperation.  In choosing Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan as the 
recipients of a first-ever visit from a Russian president, it certainly appears that 
he is attempting to exploit recent US problems in the region by courting its 
traditional allies.  Although many subjects were on the agenda, the inclusion of 
Sergei Chemezov, the head of Rosoboronexport, Russia’s sole military export 
company, (1) was an indication of the importance military-technical cooperation 
would play in this visit. (2) 
 
The Saudi Arabian visit presents perhaps the most surprising development, with 
reports indicating that the Saudis are considering seriously the purchase of 150 
T-90 main battle tanks.  Tests have been conducted over the course of the past 
year in Saudi Arabia to assess the suitability and reliability of these vehicles in 
the harsh desert terrain. (3)  Although there are no indications of the results of 
these trials, the fact that the Saudis are even considering the purchase of 
Russian equipment signals a significant shift in mindset.  It is accurate to say that 
more than 80% of Saudi military equipment currently comes from American 
manufacturers, with most of the remainder being produced in Western Europe, 
mainly France.  The current Saudi armored force consists primarily of US M-1 
Abrams tanks and M-113 armored personnel carriers, with a good number of 
French AMX tanks.  The inclusion of the Russian T-90 in this mix will present 
some significant logistical hurdles.  A country doesn’t accept these challenges 
without good reason. 
 
Putin's visits to Qatar and Jordan, although they are long-term US allies in the 
region, do not represent such drastic shifts in policy.  Qatar seems to be 
interested, at least in the military sphere, in some rather small-scale “anti-
terrorist” equipment. (4)  Nevertheless, this must be taken in light of the 
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significant US military presence in this very small country.  Primarily, the US has 
its largest airbase in the Middle East, Al-Udeid, only a few miles outside of the 
capital of Doha.  In addition, the Combined Air Operation Center for the oversight 
of all US air operations in the Middle East is located there, in addition to a 
significant US army presence.  
 
Jordan, for its part, is interested only in “boosting military cooperation,” and 
purchasing grenade launchers and “other types of arms.” (5)  Although these are 
low-level and low-budget items, Jordan also provided the avenue for other 
significant contracts when Putin visited with Mahmoud Abbas, in Amman.  
Sources close to the Kremlin have reported that the Russians are very keen to 
provide military assistance to the Palestinians and would therefore like to see 
closer relations between Hamas and Fatah. (6)  Anatoly Mazurkevich, the head 
of the Russian Defense Ministry’s international cooperation department, stated 
that Russia was “refraining” from selling arms to the Palestinian administration, 
although there have been talks on the possible supply of 150 armored personnel 
carriers. (7) 
 
Although Putin's stops in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Qatar represent a Russian 
foray into traditionally US markets, other more familiar Russian arms purchasers 
also have been negotiating deals.  When Syrian President Bashar Assad visited 
Moscow in December of last year, he stated that talks were conducted “in the 
most general nature” on arms deals, however reports since that time indicate that 
they were anything but.  Syria indicated an interest in purchasing at least eight 
different military weapons systems, to include Kornet anti-tank missiles, S-300, 
Strelets and Pantsir air defense systems, AMUR-1650 submarines, and MiG-29 
fighter aircraft.  Finally, perhaps the most controversial item was the discussion 
of the Iskander-E tactical ballistic missile system. (8) 
 
The sale of the Iskander-E has a long history, beginning in 2004. The Iskander-E 
has an operational range that would allow it to reach all cities in Israel, were it 
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deployed on the Golan Heights.  Understandably, this aroused significant protest 
from both the Israelis and the US that caused Russia to cancel the contract in 
April of 2005, although President Putin indicated that work could continue at 
some time in the future. (9)  The Syrians are anxious to begin work again on this 
very strategic weapons system, and it seems that “some time” might be now. 
 
Two other systems that may cause the US and Israel significant concern are the 
Strelets surface to air missile system and the Kornet anti-tank weapon.  In the 
case of the Kornet, which is a sophisticated, shaped-charge weapon capable of 
disabling the best Western tanks, their fears are well-founded. There already are 
documented cases of weapons from Syria's arsenal being used to good effect by 
such parties as Hezbollah or Iraqi terrorists. (10)  Similar fears are harbored with 
the Strelets.  If the missile system is sold with the Igla missile, there is a chance 
that this shoulder-launch SAM also could be used by terrorist organizations, even 
against airliners.  There are some indications, however, that talks are stalled for 
exactly this reason, as the Russians refuse to sell the Strelets to the Syrians 
unless they accept an older, less capable missile. (11) 
 
And lastly, there remains Iran, which Russia also courts in the arms trade 
business.  Most significant is the recent Iranian purchase of the Tor-1M anti-
aircraft missile system from the Russians. (See February 8, 2007, and November 
6, 2006, ISCIP Analysts for further details.) It seems now that this $700M deal for 
29 systems has been completed. (12)  Last month Valery Kashin, the head of the 
Engineering Design Bureau, stated that Russia had “met all its commitments” for 
this contract by the end of 2006. (13)  This was further confirmed by then 
Defense Secretary Sergei Ivanov, who also acknowledged that all of the missiles 
had been delivered. (14) 
 
The significant military-technology inroads that Russia has made in recent 
months in the Middle East may not represent the beginning of a new Cold War, 
but they surely indicate a small coup.  With Russia taking third place for 
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armament sales in that region, behind both the US and France, it has made 
significant strides to catch up. (15)  Even more alarming to its rivals is that the 
inroads have been made not only with countries the US still considers to be its 
strong allies, but also its traditional “enemies” in the region.  Flexing his muscles 
in Munich, President Putin has now started putting them to use in the Middle 
East. 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Alexey Dynkin 
 
Munich 2007 
Vladimir Putin’s speech on February 10 at the Munich Conference on Security 
Policy evidently was intended to present a significant statement of Russian 
international views and was received with mixed reviews: US Sen. John McCain 
(R-Ariz.), who attended the conference, called it “the most aggressive speech 
from a Russian leader since the end of the Cold War," (1) while at least one 
Russian observer compared it to Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech in Fulton in 
1946, and further characterized Putin's remarks as “a kind of foreign policy 
bequest…the declaration of the country's new foreign policy course which will be 
implemented after Putin leaves the post of president and whose cornerstone is 
confrontation with Washington.” (2)  An Iranian editorial chose a different historic 
analogy: A Stalinist reference to capitalism as the biggest threat to human 
society. (3) 
 
The speech, described by US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates as “very 
candid,” (4) contains some fundamental  analyses of the present global status, 
along with a number of very specific, and a few veiled, accusations levied at the 
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US and others. Putin began the substantive part of his address by suggesting 
that “the problem of international security goes beyond the issue of military-
political stability. It is [also] world economic stability, poverty relief, economic 
security and the development of dialogue between civilizations.” (5)  Having thus 
linked economics and culture with security, Putin proceeded to describe the 
balance of power that has emerged since the end of the Cold War. Interestingly, 
he first declared that “the unipolar world…has not been created,” and then almost 
immediately went on to warn about the dangers of just such a world, stating that 
“in practice it means only one thing: one center of power, one center of force, one 
center of decision-making...a world of one master, one sovereign. And in the end, 
it is destructive not only for those who find themselves within this system, but for 
the sovereign itself, because it is destroyed from the inside.” (6) 
 
On the topic of international security and stability, Putin said that unilateral 
decision-making is not conducive to it, but, on the contrary, results in the creation 
of new conflicts, referring to these conflicts as “human tragedies and powder 
kegs” (7) —an apparent reference to the ongoing violence in Iraq and increasing 
tension concerning Iran's nuclear program. In addition, during the question-and-
answer session that followed the speech, Putin accused the United States of 
initiating a new arms race by launching its missile defense program, (8) 
essentially repeating the objections raised to the Soviet anti-ballistic missile 
program during the 1960s by the late academician Sakharov, namely, that a 
missile defense shield creates a situation where the power in possession of the 
shield may lose fear of retaliation and thus be encouraged to act aggressively. 
Putin then claimed that, as Russia cannot afford to build its own missile defense 
system to balance that of the United States, it will instead develop an 
“asymmetric response,” that is, a missile which cannot be intercepted by an a 
missile defense system. In his final touch, Putin added, “It’s nothing personal. It’s 
only a calculation.” (9) 
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If one accepts the premise that the existence of a single hegemonic power 
makes for an inherently unstable world system, it follows that Putin’s speech was 
addressed not directly to that power itself, but to other players on the world 
scene, particularly those for whom the end of the cold war has presented an 
opportunity to play a greater role; those who might see American hegemony as 
the principal barrier to fulfilling that role. Putin mentioned China, India, Brazil and 
Russia explicitly as growing economic powers whose geopolitical clout is bound 
to increase with their growing economic strength. (10) 
 
Putin also challenged the moral consistency of countries that refuse to apply the 
death penalty even for dangerous criminals, yet participate in conflicts in which 
“hundreds, thousands of innocent people are killed,” (11) no doubt a reference to 
EU member states that participate in US-led military operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. And, when questioned about the transfer of advanced weapons 
systems to Iran, Putin replied defensively that most of Iran’s weapons don’t even 
come from Russia (taking care to mention Iran’s F-14 fighter jets and their spare 
parts that were only recently declared illegal to sell), and further, that the recent 
delivery of defensive missiles (presumably the Tor-M1) was intended to keep Iran 
from feeling “cornered...so that [Iran] knows that has a channel for 
communication, that it has friends it can trust.” (12)  Thus, in one statement he 
casts the United States, rather than Russia, as the main arms distributor in the 
world, and at the same time reaches out precisely to one of the regional powers 
that seeks to expand its relative global (or at least regional) role at the expense 
of the United States. 
 
Whether intended or not, Putin’s speech has made an impact in some unlikely 
places. Thus, for example, the speech helped trigger a public debate in the 
Czech Republic between the ruling party and the opposition on the question of 
permitting the installation of a missile defense system on Czech territory. (13)  In 
Turkey—another major player whose orientation has grown more ambivalent in 
recent years –an editorial recently appeared in the moderately Islamic daily 
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Today’s Zaman, raising the possibility of a future Turkish-Iranian-Russian 
rapprochement, noting that the Munich speech was posted on the Turkish chief 
of general staff’s Web site. (14)  A second editorial in the same publication 
praised the speech and echoed Putin’s statements about the dangers of US 
unilateralism. (15)  There has been no policy change in Turkey; however, the 
appearance of the speech on the chief of staff’s Web site may be an indication 
that those in higher circles are at least paying attention. 
 
Is Putin’s speech really a declaration of a new Cold War, as some have 
suggested, or merely an affirmation of an already existing state of affairs? 
Certainly the tone was unusually blunt and aggressive. However, most of the 
content appears to be more or less in line with Russian policies of the past 
several years. The idea of promoting “multi-polarity”—the Primakov doctrine—
has been a major element in Russian foreign policy since the late Yel'tsin period, 
when Russia pursued relations with China and India while engaging in nuclear 
cooperation with Iran and arms deals with traditional Soviet client states like 
Syria. That being the case, the question is: why now? 
 
Why, for example, if the US missile defense system is perceived as a threat to 
the power balance, can’t Russia just build its asymmetric response quietly while 
maintaining civil relations—as it has attempted to do (and not just with its 
strategic weapons) in the past? Perhaps it is meant to counter the crisis that has 
been brewing and may yet erupt over the Iranian nuclear program. That is, by 
stating more or less explicitly where Russia stands, Putin can oppose the United 
States with a “clear conscience,” and justify the basis of Russia’s support for Iran. 
The fact that Putin scheduled his tour of the Middle East right after the speech 
suggests that he intended the message to be heard by all potentially interested 
parties by the time of his visit—including traditionally pro-American Middle 
Eastern states such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan—and positions him to clarify 
any questions his remarks may have produced. 
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Finally, the confrontational response to the proposed deployments of missile 
defense systems to former East Bloc countries may be intended as a warning 
against the possible future inclusion in NATO of Ukraine and Georgia; that is, if 
NATO can be persuaded that any expansion of the alliance might entail a return 
to the Cold War, there might be a reluctance to accept new members for fear of 
encountering a hostile Russia on top of already existing problems. Whatever the 
reason, Putin’s Munich address certainly accomplished one thing: it gave the 
Russian president a forum in which he could present an aggressive version of 
Russian foreign policy. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
GEORGIA 
NATO or subordination to Moscow? 
Georgian foreign relations in February 2007 could be caricatured handily by the 
image of President Saakashvili with an angel whispering in one ear and a devil 
whispering in the other. One of the creatures would look like Jaap de Hoop 
Scheffer, Secretary General of NATO, whispering, “NATO, 2009!;” the other like 
Vyacheslav Kovalenko, Russian ambassador to Georgia, who would be 
whispering, “Normalized relations with Russia!” Which is the devil and which the 
angel depends entirely upon the artist’s political persuasion. 
 
In the past two weeks, Georgia has been presented with two broad appeals from 
two parties, Russia and NATO. The appeals, it must be said, are very different in 
kind; the Russian proposal, laid out by Vyacheslav Kovalenko in a news 
conference on February 6, is a list bristling with particulars regarding relations 
between the two neighbors. The NATO plan delivered by Jaap de Hoop Scheffer 
at the Munich Security Conference is more like a series of phrases, each 
beginning with “I would like to see…” that amount to a seductive catalog of 
ambitions for the organization’s 60th anniversary in 2009. (1)  The hope held out 
by Scheffer to Ukraine and Georgia was slender, particularly when compared to 
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the preceding comment about seeing Serbia “firmly on the road to NATO 
membership.” His exact words in reference to the post-Soviet states were “I 
would like to see us coming closer to honoring the ambitions of Ukraine and 
Georgia.” (2) 
 
Undeterred, President Saakashvili hailed the comments as a substantive 
proposal of NATO membership, set within a two-year timeframe; he confidently 
asserted that Scheffer’s speech “is further evidence that nothing can prevent 
Georgia from joining NATO.” (3)  His enthusiasm echoed in the halls of Georgia’s 
parliament, where Chairperson Nino Burjanadze called the Secretary General’s 
words “historic,” adding, “the goal on which we have been talking and working for 
so [long] is now becoming real.” (4)  Her statement underlines the fact that the 
Georgian government has chosen to treat the spectral language of NATO 
spokespersons as corporal fact, real enough to kindle intense public debate on 
the merits of NATO membership. While the president’s ruling National Movement 
Party treats membership as an imminent and beneficial step toward alliance with 
the West, members of opposition parties are warning that accession to NATO will 
imperil Georgia’s sovereignty over its breakaway regions. Irakli Melashvili from 
National Forum, an opposition party formed last November, posed the ominous 
question, “if Georgia becomes a NATO member without at first solving separatist 
conflicts, what that would mean? Does it mean that we will have Russian 
militaries and NATO forces standing on our soil simultaneously, which would be 
equal to splitting the country into several parts with Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia?” (5)  Givi Targamadze of the ruling party dismissed Melashvili’s 
argument and accused the National Forum of being a puppet of Moscow, paid to 
sabotage Georgia’s efforts at joining the western alliance. 
 
Opposition to NATO is an unpopular stance in Georgia, where, according to a 
recent poll, 83% of the citizenry support membership in the alliance. Blunt talk of 
the real obstacles facing the country on the path to membership can elicit dark 
allegations of conspiracy, such as those being circulated by the Georgian 
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government-backed NATO Information Center, headed by Tornike 
Sharashenidze, who told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that Georgia has seen 
attempts by “certain political forces” to split public opinion on the issue of NATO. 
(6)  Voices that raise doubts about the likelihood of Georgia’s accession run the 
risk of being tarred with the same brush as the pro-Russian National Forum Party 
or simply of being marginalized. Salome Zourabichvili, Georgia’s former foreign 
minister and leader of the opposition party Georgia’s Way, is among the minority 
that has accused the government of lying to the public about chances of joining 
NATO. Zourabichvili pointed out recently that all statements of support coming 
from NATO members have been made in informal contexts, and as yet remain 
unsubstantiated by the concrete terms of a prerequisite Membership Action Plan. 
She is joined by New Generation Initiative, a Georgian NGO that issued a 
statement to the effect that the government is deliberately misconstruing the 
likelihood of Georgia’s accession to NATO. “It is the right of a party or of an 
individual to voice a position on NATO, but it is absolutely unacceptable to distort 
facts intentionally or unintentionally,” read the statement as reported by Civil 
Georgia. (7) 
 
The Saakashvili government has chosen NATO as its polestar, however, leaving 
scant room for public discussion of the country’s actual potential for membership. 
To deny the inevitability of the process is to fall into line with demands set by 
Moscow, something Tbilisi has been loath to do. When Ambassador Vyacheslav 
Kovalenko laid out steps toward normalization of Georgia-Russian relations, he 
stressed the desire by Moscow to see its southern neighbor as an independent, 
sovereign and neutral country. Postal and transport links would be restored, he 
promised, along with the restoration of accredited Russian-language schools and 
Russian visas, but certain reciprocal measures would be expected of Georgia in 
turn,  including the squelching of anti-Russian rhetoric that dominates public 
discourse in Tbilisi. In effect, Moscow offered a return to the status quo, with 
Moscow as the prime mediator in Georgia’s frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, and Georgia as a client state. 
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The full significance of the ambassador’s insistence upon Georgian neutrality 
was revealed the following week by President Putin’s incendiary speech at the 
Munich Security Conference, where he railed against NATO encroachment 
toward Russia’s borders. Overlooking the fact that membership is voluntary by 
countries, such as Georgia, seeking to ensure European security, he retorted, 
“on the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of 
mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion 
intended?” (7)  Moscow clearly paints the organization as an aggressor, and 
Georgia’s membership, however improbable, as anathema to Russian interests. 
NATO is described as the thorn in Moscow’s side that Tbilisi is determined to 
keep in place, at any cost. 
 
Thus far into his presidency, Saakashvili’s soaring optimism has buoyed his 
country through civil war in the breakaway regions and recession brought on by 
Russian embargoes. Should the government allow its campaign for complete 
independence from Moscow to blind the Georgian public to the unlikelihood of 
early NATO membership, however, the tactic could backfire. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
Turkmen elections produce expected, and unexpected, results 
As expected, Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedov, Turkmenistan’s acting president 
and former deputy prime minister and minister of health, won the 11 February 
elections quite handily, garnering 89.23% of the vote, according to Central 
Election Commission (CEC) Chairman Myrat Garryyew. (1)  Official figures cite 
total voter turnout at 98.65% of all those eligible, with high participation not only 
in the capital, but in all five provinces, as well, (2) a claim disputed by a number 
of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty correspondents, who reported that turnout in 
Ashgabat and in the provincial capital Lebap seemed light. (3) 
 
One OSCE official, Spanish MP Jesus Lopez-Medel, went so far as to call the 
election a fraud, stating “The Turkmen presidential election was rather like a play 
than an election, a farce instead of the citizens' real participation in the electoral 
process.” (4)  Due to time constraints, the OSCE was unable to send an observer 
mission, but instead sent a support team to help the OSCE’s Ashgabat office 
follow election developments, as well as to meet with election organizers. (5)   
OSCE officials were not allowed to be present during the vote counting, causing 
Mr. Lopez-Medel to conclude “everything was decided in advance and the voting 
was nothing else than a mere appearance.” (6)  His comments were echoed by 
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fellow team member Jose Soares, who deemed the elections neither free nor 
fair. (7) 
 
Hudayberdi Orazov, leader of the Turkmen opposition party Watan, also 
criticized the election results and even questioned their legitimacy, stating that 
according to his sources, only 10-12% of voters had participated in the election. 
(8)  Turkmenistan’s laws require that at least 50% of eligible voters participate in 
a presidential election, in order for it to be considered valid. (9)  Nurmuhammed 
Hanamov, chairman of the Republican Party (also an opposition party), called the 
election so predictable as to be “pure insolence.” (10) 
 
Turkmenistan’s first post-Niyazov elections undoubtedly were neither free nor fair 
and did not allow for any real debate among the candidates over the country’s 
future.  President Berdymuhammedov and his supporters in the CEC and 
security services managed to exclude all of Turkmenistan’s opposition parties 
from the campaign and the polling process itself was most likely riven with voter 
fraud, producing highly inflated turnout figures.  However, in spite of his heavy-
handed manipulation of the CEC and People’s Council, in order to ensure his 
succession, President Berdymuhammedov’s first two weeks in office have 
yielded rather surprising results – he has begun implementing his campaign 
promises.  One of the new president’s first acts was to sign a decree on 16 
February which reinstated the ten-year secondary school curriculum, which is to 
be come effective starting 1 September 2007.   The same decree increases the 
standard university curriculum to five years and now requires six years of study 
at medical institutions and at some arts institutions. (11)  In another surprising 
turn of events, two Internet cafes opened in the center of Ashgabat, each 
equipped with five computers.  Cafe administrator Jenet Khudaikulieva promised 
that no web sites would be blocked from public access and an Associated Press 
reporter was able to visit both international news and opposition party sites, 
without any trouble.  The biggest obstacle to the public’s use of the Internet cafes 
will undoubtedly be the price – one hour of use costs US$4.00, which is more 
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than a day’s wage for most of Turkmenistan’s citizens.  President 
Berdymuhammedov has pledged to provide public schools with Internet access, 
as well as to permit more Internet cafes to open in other regions. (12)  He also 
ordered that a commission be established to hear the public’s complaints 
regarding the behavior of law enforcement personnel.  Berdymuhammedov will 
chair the commission himself, perhaps in an effort to increase his oversight of law 
enforcement organs. (13) 
 
Thus, it appears that a very mild thaw is underway in the Turkmen government’s 
attitude toward political freedom and the general welfare of its citizens.  Although 
President Berdymuhammedov continues to make only positive remarks about the 
late Turkmenbashy’s policies and vows to honor them, in fact, he already has 
begun dismantling Niyazov’s domestic initiatives.  He still has miles to go and 
has yet to address some of his greatest challenges, such as unemployment, 
agricultural reform and reform of the healthcare system, however, his recent 
actions could be interpreted as a sign that his commitment to improving the lives 
of his constituents is real. 
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UKRAINE 
Yushchenko awards medal to disgraced prosecutor 
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With so many “big” news stories in Ukraine—energy issues, the fight for political 
control, questions over foreign policy—it’s easy to miss the smaller items.  But 
sometimes, these smaller items send very large signals.  
 
For example, on 16 February, President Viktor Yushchenko awarded former 
Ukrainian Prosecutor General Mykhailo Potebenko the Order of (Kyivan) Prince 
Yaroslav the Wise.  Yaroslav introduced the first book of laws in what was then 
Kyivan Rus’ during the 11th century and is credited with expanding both the 
principality’s territory and culture.  The medal was created in 1996 for 
“distinguished service to the state and people of Ukraine,” and it recognizes, 
among other things, “wisdom” and “honor.” (1)   
 
According to President Yushchenko’s decree, Potebenko was awarded the 
medal “for his great personal contribution to the creation of a law abiding state, 
the strengthening of legality and law and order, and his long-term work on the 
occasion of his 70th birthday.” (2) 
 
The decree probably would have been missed by most Ukraine-watchers in the 
West were it not for long-time Ukraine analyst Taras Kuzio, who found the three-
line decree and publicized it on his blog. (3)   This is fortunate, since the small 
decree speaks volumes about President Viktor Yushchenko. 
 
Kuzio termed the awarding of this medal to Potebenko “shameful,” and it is 
possible that others may find this an understatement. 
 
Potebenko became well-known internationally in 2001 when he led two major 
high-profile investigations as Ukraine’s Prosecutor-General – the examination of 
the murder of journalist Georgy Gongadze and the prosecution of Yulia 
Tymoshenko.    
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The Prosecutor-General’s “investigation” of the Gongadze case was roundly 
criticized by just about every international organization looking into the matter, 
leading eventually to calls from the Council of Europe, Reporters Without Borders 
and then US Ambassador Carlos Pasqual for him to resign.  Potebenko was 
accused of stymieing the investigation in order to protect state officials, including 
President Leonid Kuchma, who appeared to be implicated in Gongadze’s death. 
 
In 2005, after months of evidence collection, the European Court of Human 
Rights satisfied a number of complaints from Georgiy’s widow, Myroslava 
Gongadze, including her charge of a “failure to investigate the case.”  The court 
found that the prosecutor’s office had ignored repeated requests for assistance 
from Georgiy Gongadze in the weeks before his death, when he reported being 
followed by state law enforcement officials.  “The response of the GPO was not 
only formalistic,” the court wrote, “but also blatantly negligent.” 
 
Moreover, following the recovery of Gongadze’s headless body, the court said, 
“The State authorities were more preoccupied with proving the lack of 
involvement of high-level State officials in the case than discovering the truth 
about the circumstances of the disappearance and death of the applicant’s 
husband.” (4) 
 
Mikhailo Potebenko was the Prosecutor General during these events.  Not only 
did he apparently conduct little investigation, but he denied that the body 
recovered was Gongadze’s in spite of numerous DNA tests to the contrary and 
then refused to accept as evidence secretly recorded tapes of President Kuchma 
implicating him at least in Gongadze’s disappearance, and probably his murder.  
 
The European Court of Human Rights wrote, “The fact that the alleged offenders, 
two of them active police officers, were identified and charged with the kidnap 
and murder of the journalist just a few days after the change in the country’s 
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leadership, raised serious doubts as to the genuine wish of the authorities under 
the previous government to investigate the case thoroughly.” (5) 
 
As Potebenko and Kuchma were being criticized internationally, and facing 
increasing protests domestically, the Prosecutor-General announced that he was 
investigating then Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko for a variety of 
offenses, including embezzlement during her time as head of the gas 
intermediary Unified Energy Systems.  Although Tymoshenko sat in government, 
her refusal to drop a number of anti-corruption measures that affected the 
president’s supporters had led to considerable tension between the two.    
 
Eventually, she was fired, arrested, and held in prison for 40 days before being 
released by a court for lack of probable cause.  Yushchenko, who was prime 
minister at the time, called the arrest “political persecution.”  (6) Persecution, 
then, by the same Potebenko recently awarded a medal by Yushchenko.  
 
Despite years of attempts, Potebenko (and his successors) were never able to 
prove in court any of their charges against Tymoshenko, who then perhaps had 
the best revenge by being named the first prime minister after the Orange 
Revolution. 
 
At the very least, Potebenko’s work on Tymoshenko’s case was shoddy and 
unprofessional.  At the worst, it was designed to do nothing more than to 
persecute an opponent of the president.  Or perhaps it was designed simply to 
take the attention away from the Gongadze case, which was creating such 
problems for him, Kuchma and the country. 
 
This is the man, then, to whom President Yushchenko last week awarded a 
medal for “service to the country,” “wisdom,” and “honor.” 
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In 2004, during his presidential campaign and the Orange Revolution, 
Yushchenko vowed to prosecute those who had ordered the murder of 
Gongadze.  It was, he said, “a matter of honor.” (7)  The organizers have not 
been arrested or prosecuted, however, and at this point—seven years after the 
murder and over two years after Yushchenko took office—it is unlikely that they 
ever will be. 
 
In fact, many observers and politicians have suggested that Yushchenko struck a 
deal with Kuchma during the revolution – Yushchenko would ensure Kuchma’s 
freedom and Kuchma would not stand in the way of the rerun presidential 
election that brought Yushchenko to power.  While no one can ever truly know 
why the organizers of the Gongadze murder have not been arrested, the 
possibility of a compromise agreement fits well with Yushchenko’s nature of 
deliberation and conciliation. 
 
Repeatedly throughout his political career, Yushchenko has chosen compromise 
over confrontation.  In the last year, Yushchenko blessed the return of his 
defeated presidential opponent Viktor Yanukovych to the premiership, and then 
gave in to Yanukovych’s pressure to replace Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk 
instead of fighting for his longtime ally.  
 
And now, the President has done his best to rehabilitate the career of Mykhailo 
Potebenko, a man Yushchenko himself once condemned, and a man who 
remains disgraced internationally.  
 
One wonders what Yaroslav the Wise would have thought.  
 
Mrs. Tymoshenko goes to Washington 
 On 26 February, Ukraine’s parliamentary opposition leader and former Prime 
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko arrives in the US for a five day visit that will include 
stops in New York City and Washington DC. 
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The majority of her time will be spent in Washington, wooing US officials, political 
leaders, journalists and business representatives.  The visit comes just two 
months after a similar jaunt by Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, whose inability 
to provide firm answers to questions failed to impress officials. 
 
Tymoshenko’s time in the US capital is expected to be capped off by meetings 
with both Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.  
Cheney’s decision to see Tymoshenko is somewhat of a coup, given the Vice 
President’s usual hesitance to meet politicians not holding state positions.   
 
The planned meetings demonstrate Washington's keen interest in Ukraine, and 
the Bush administration’s desire to continue to support a country viewed by many 
as having real potential as an example of a successful transition from (semi) 
authoritarianism to democracy.   
 
The transition has not gone nearly as smoothly as the US had hoped.   Although 
defeated by Yushchenko in the presidential election, Yanukovych faired well in 
last year’s parliamentary elections, used division among the “democrats” in 
parliament to return to his previous position of Prime Minister, and then used 
recent constitutional amendments to consolidate his power at the expense of 
Yushchenko.  
 
The Prime Minister’s most recent tenure has included an imposition of grain 
export quotas in order to control prices manually—resulting in storage bins of 
rotting grain—agreements with petrol companies to control prices outside of 
market mechanisms, and a suggestion that the country was negotiating with 
Russia to “merge” their pipeline system.   
 
However, unlike every other country in the former Soviet Union (excluding the 
Baltics), Ukraine can boast of a real, strong, independent opposition.  According 
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to Tymoshenko’s top foreign policy advisor and the deputy head of her bloc, 
Hryhoriy Nemyria, while in Washington, Ukraine’s opposition leader will “speak to 
both sides on Capitol Hill,” in order to “take away some positive lessons and see 
how they may be applied to ongoing reform efforts in Ukraine.” (9) 
 
In addition, Tymoshenko suggests that one of the primary messages of her 
meetings will be to underscore the “deep transition” that her country is now 
undergoing, and the need for support and understanding as it does so. (10) 
 
BELARUS 
What will Lukashenko do now? 
 It has been a difficult couple of months for Belarusian President Alyeksandr 
Lukashenko.  The year started with Russia forcing his country to agree to a 
doubling of the price paid for natural gas in order to avoid a shut-off.  The 
agreement, by world market standards, still was generous – from $50 per 1,000 
cubic meters to $100.  This puts the price Belarus pays for Russian gas well 
below both Western European prices, which reach $260 per 1,000 cubic meters, 
and the prices paid by other former Soviet Republics, which range from $130 
(Ukraine) to $235 (Georgia).  But for Belarus’ unreformed economy, $100 is likely 
just as bad.  
 
Even more, as part of the deal, Lukashenko also was forced to relinquish 50% 
ownership of state pipeline operator Beltransgaz to Russia’s Gazprom.  
 
Just days later, Russia announced that it would impose a $180 per ton custom’s 
duty on oil exported to Belarus.  This would have increased the price of oil from 
about $40 per ton to $220.  Belarus refused to pay and demanded a transit fee 
from Russia.  
 
In a rambling television address, Lukashenko said, “If they are drowning in 
petrodollars and other currency income and have decided … to place us in 
 41 
conditions worse even than Germany and other European countries, then let’s 
ask this rich Russia to pay us for our services.”  (11) 
 
His demands were largely pointless.  Russia quickly turned off the tap.  Several 
days later, a final duty of $53 was agreed, for a price per ton of under $100.  But 
again, the price has more than doubled. 
 
Russia also announced its intention to immediately begin building a pipeline 
bypassing Belarus.   Russia’s pipeline operator Transneft said that it had already 
begun work on a “spur from the Belarus border to the Russian Baltic Sea port of 
Primorsk.”  The work, it said, would take less than 18 months, thus quickly 
eliminated Russia’s need to use Belarus as a transit state – and eliminating 
Belarus’ only leverage with Russia.  (12) 
 
The increase in oil prices will be particularly difficult to absorb for Belarus, which 
imported bargain price oil and then exported the same oil to Western Europe for 
market prices.  In this way, Lukashenko maintained his hold on his largely 
bankrupt country. 
 
Russian President Vladimir Putin recently suggested that Russia would now 
subsidize Belarus directly with over $3 billion in payments, in order to lessen the 
impact of the oil price increase.  Thus, Belarus becomes, in a sense, a beggar, 
dependent on Russian cash handouts to maintain its most basic functions.   
Previously, Lukashenko largely did what he wanted with the exported oil funds.  
That likely will no longer be the case. 
 
But where can Lukashenko turn for support?  Belarus’ president has become a 
pariah in Europe, thanks to the hard work he has done to earn the title, “The last 
dictator in Europe.”  Independent media are gone, his political opponents have 
been imprisoned or persecuted, and some have simply disappeared.  There is no 
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freedom of assembly.  Religion is strictly controlled.  The country is the very 
definition of an authoritarian state.   
 
But Lithuania—long one of Belarus’ most consistent critic—has thrown a small, 
fragile lifeline.  
 
Last month, Lithuania sent a new Ambassador to Minsk, and he came with a 
message.  Following the spat over oil transit fees, Edminas Bagdonas said, “We 
could become your advocate in Brussels and in a dialog with the EU.”  The 
Ambassador was cautious, however, suggesting that his country “is waiting for 
specific proposals from the Belarusian side.”  (13) 
 
Specifically, Lithuania has proposed to Belarus and Ukraine to create a new oil 
distribution network, which would supply oil from Lithuania’s Klaipeda terminal 
directly to Kyiv and/or Minsk.  The oil would be jointly purchased at the 
Rotterdam oil exchange and brought to Klaipeda in tankers.  The system, 
according to Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus, would not replace Russian 
oil, but would provide “guarantees against an oil blockade by Russia.” (14) 
 
Ukraine immediately accepted the proposal, while Lukashenko said he is 
studying the issue. 
 
The EU also opened a very tentative crack in response to Belarus’ problems with 
Russia.  “If there is even the slightest chance that the Belarusian regime is ready 
to conduct an honest dialogue with Europe, then the EU should, in the exclusive 
interest of democratizing the country and liberating its oppressed populace, seize 
the opportunity, but set strict conditions from the beginning,” said Hans-Gerd 
Pöttering, the president of the European Parliament.  
 
It is likely that Lukashenko has no intention of meeting any of the conditions that 
may be set by the EU.  In the last month, he has ordered 10 Americans deported 
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for singing religious songs and distributing spiritual literature from an 
unrecognized religion (evangelical Protestantism), signed a new “defense 
agreement” with Iran, announced an increase in bilateral relations with Sudan, 
arrested 10 individuals for holding a march in support of EU integration, 
threatened to stop the publication of the cultural journal “Arche,” and introduced 
new laws that require internet cafes to keep logs of sites accessed by their 
customers.  Reading “banned” sites, like the human rights organization Charter 
97, for example, could result in arrest and prison for both the reader and the cafe 
owner.  (15) 
 
It is therefore unlikely that Lukashenko's recent anger at Russia will result in 
anything more than loud proclamations and increasing attempts to stifle dissent.  
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